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THE "MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP" IN THE
CONFLICTS LAW OF TORTS
LAW AND REASON VERSUS THE RESTATEMENT SECOND
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG*
"The object of the [American Law] Institute in preparing the Restatement is to
present an orderly statement of the general common law of the United States...."'
That the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws failed to reach this aim and
indeed misled the courts by its "dogmatic and over-simplified character"2 as well as
by its adherence to the discredited doctrine of vested rights, was recognized by the
leading scholars at the time of publication and is now generally admitted.
One might have hoped that this experience would preclude further attempts at
"restating" a body of "rules" whose coherence as an independent branch of the law
accessible to "orderly statement" remains subject to doubt. Unhappily, however,
the American Law Institute has for more than a decade been engaged in "revising"
its original product. Professor Reese, the able Reporter for this Restatement Second,
has offered a description of his effort in the present symposium It is with con-
siderable misgivings that I have accepted the editor's invitation to comment on this
paper. I have stated elsewhere, perhaps all too often and all too vigorously, my
opposition to both the substance and the procedure of the American Law Institute's
undertaking in this field. Moreover, it is always a hateful task to attack the work
of a man for whom you feel the highest personal regard. Only the remaining hope
to induce the Restaters to withdraw their latest draft on the conflicts law of torts"
has prompted me to offer these comments despite my misgivings.
Professor Reese expects to be able to improve upon the work of his predecessor
because he and his Advisers "can seek guidance from the large number of cases that
have been decided, from the legislation that has been enacted, and from the books
and articles that have been written since the appearance of the original Restatement."
However, for reasons no doubt inherent in his task rather than chargeable to his
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skill, he has not in fact been able to avail himself of these opportunities. In my
treatise I have attempted to show throughout that the analysis, which according to
the Reporter's Notes underlies the tentative drafts of the Restatement Second, in-
cludes a vast number of cases that fail to decide conflicts between differing laws and
can therefore not properly be adduced as authorities7 I have further attempted
to show that the language of most of the remaining cases is fatally burdened by the
theories advanced by the Restatement which have now been recognized as erroneous,
and is frequently, if not usually, inconsistent with the results actually reached.
Finally, even casual perusal of the Reporter's Notes shows how rarely the new
drafts have heeded the nearly unanimous opposition of today's leading authors, very
few of whom are included among his Advisers. But be this as it may, an obviously
conclusive reason for discontinuing the Restatement Second is the Reporter's con-
cession that "choice of law, even now, is not ripe for restatement in the sense that
it is rarely possible to state hard and fast rules with the reasonable assurance based
on precedent and the resources of human reasoning and imagination that these rules
will work well in all situations to which they literally can be applied."'
Although having made this concession, Professor Reese still sees justification for
a continuation of his effort in the hope to formulate "rules" which at least will not
mislead' and will not be in the way of progress."° But even this aim, all too
modest for this ambitious enterprise, is not reached with regard to the outstanding
example for such a "rule," namely the recurring reference to the law with "the most
significant relationship." In its most recent application in the conflicts law of torts
this reference is not only misleading, being admittedly contrary to existing law, but
also in the way of progress and thus contrary to reason.
Professor Reese admits that "until recently the courts with rare unanimity applied
the law of the place of injury to determine rights and liabilities in tort,"" but
discounts that practice because "recently ... several important courts have either
expressed dissatisfaction with the rule or else have reached results that are inconsistent
with it."'" That fact might have justified a detailed analysis of results actually
reached in individual fact situations.' 3 But it does not justify the American Law
Institute under the pretext of "restating" existing law to advance a general proposi-
tion which, prior to its tentative announcement, had never been adopted by any
court. A "restatement" cannot be properly used to "aid in inducing the courts to
'tSee TREATIsE § 123, at 310-I, 439 n.iO, 449 n.3, 466 n.zi, and passim.
' Reese, supra note 2, at 681.
91d. at 699.
10 Ibid.
" Ibid. See also Reese, The Ever Changing Rules of Choice of Law, 1962 NED. TsjsscsR.
INT. R. 389, 390; id., Comment, 63 COLUTm. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1963).
Reese, supra note 2, at 699.
'
5 There is only one problem among twenty "issues covered" (§§ 3791-39og) as to which the Draft
is not satisfied with the law of the "most significant relationship," namely the problem of intra-family
immunity (§ 390g). Here, where the Draft, by referring to the law of the parties' common domicile,
follows prevailing opinion, it was almost immediately approved by an outstanding court. Thompson v.
Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963).
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depart from [a presumably accepted rule-here the place of injury rule] ... in situa-
dons where this is desirable."'14
But the new "rule" is not only admittedly contrary to prevailing authority. It is
quite apt to be in the way of progress. This may be shown by the analysis of the
first decision by an outstanding court, 5 which is squarely based on the second
Restatement's formula.
This case is Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life
Ins. Co." decided by the United States court of appeals for the fourth circuit (North
Carolina), speaking through Chief Judge Sobeloff. Plaintiff, a North Carolina
business corporation, in order to qualify for a loan of $2,ooooo for the expansion of
its business, found it necessary to seek insurance in that amount on the life of its
president. Attempting to distribute such insurance among several companies, plaintiff
applied to defendant, a Pennsylvania company, for a $2oooo policy. Approximately
three weeks later defendant informed plaintiff's agent that only a $50,ooo policy could
be approved and this counter offer was accepted with the request for further con-
sideration of the matter. Its president having died two days later, plaintiff sought
damages based on defendant's allegedly negligent delay in acting on the application.
Although the court assumed, without so holding, that North Carolina law would
permit such actions, it affirmed a summary judgment for defendant based on the
law of Pennsylvania to the contrary.
In applying the law of that state the court discounted a line of North Carolina
traffic accident cases in which foreign law had been applied as the law of the place
of wrong, on the ground that in all of those cases the place of wrongful conduct had
coincided with that of the injury, so that the North Carolina courts had never had
occasion to consider "the multi-state features presented here." ''1 Treating the case,
1' Reese, supra note 2, at 699. Cf. Reese, supra note Ii, at 392, where the author expresses doubt as
to the wisdom of the rule now advocated in his draft for the Restatement Second. The inadequacy of
the procedure underlying the preparation of the Restatement Second is dramatically illustrated by the fact
that the crucial "most significant relationship" formula was first introduced by a 13 to x2 vote of the
Council of the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332b (note)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 196o).
" To be sure, that decision, infra text at notes i6 et seq., relied on Babcock v. Jackson, z2 N.Y.2d
473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), as a precedent for the use of the Restatement Second formula. See
Leflar, Comment, 63 COLUm. L. Rav. 1247, 1249 (1963). But Babcock goes beyond that formula by
weighing state "interests" foreign to the Restatement. This technique, it should be noted, cannot be
identified with Curries analysis which precludes a weighing of his "governmental interests." See
Ehrenzweig, Comment, 63 COLum. L. Rav. 1243, 1244-1245 (1963); Currie, id. at 1233, 1234-1235,
1241. Leflar, id. at 1247, 1248, rightly suggests that "in later years it will be easy to merge the ideas
of 'significant relationship' and 'governmental interests,'" in what Cavers (id. at 1218, 1222-1229)
would deprecate as a new "jurisdiction-selecting rule." My own views, both agreement and disagree-
ment, concerning Currie's approach are stated in Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and
"True Rules," 49 CALIF. L. REv. 240, 243-248 (1961); and TREATISE S 122.
". Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4 th Cir.
x963).
"Id. at 472. But see Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
2o6 F.Supp. 427, 429 (M.D. N.C. z962), afl'd, supra note 16, where the court felt bound by "the more
traditional conflict-of-law rule" presumably adopted by North Carolina. In support of that rule, see
again the later case of Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 6o9, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963), criticized by Currie, Com-
ment, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1233, 1236-1237 (1963).
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therefore, as one of novel impression, the court would have been free to start its
analysis with the basic law of the forum. As I have tried to show elsewhere, courts
whose jurisdiction is properly invoked have at all times and in all countries, unless
misled by wrong dogma, applied their own law except where legislative or settled
judicial rules of choice of law or the policy of the forum's municipal rule have re-
quired a different answer.' 8 If the court had followed this approach, it would have
analyzed the policy of the initially applicable rule of the forum. It might have
determined that the North Carolina tort rule was primarily designed to admonish
insurers to improve their practice in handling applications.'9 It might then have
permitted defendant to exculpate itself under the law of Pennsylvania as the law to
which the conduct of its business was properly adjusted,"0 or precluded such ex-
culpation on the ground that defendant was admitted to do business in North
Carolina, a fact that apparently was the basis of the court's jurisdiction. ' In
choosing between these answers the court might have wished to ascertain whether
the defendant or the plaintiff had initiated their relationship. Or the court might
have interpreted the North Carolina rule as primarily designed to distribute fairly
the losses inevitably caused by modern interstate mass operations and given priority
to the law of North Carolina as the law of that state by which the plaintiff could
reasonably expect to be protected.22 In any event, the court would have established
a new rule of choice of law on grounds of forum policy that would have been a
meaningful guidepost for the future. And there is little doubt that this distinguished
court would have done just that-were it not for the fact that the American Law
Institute had just announced its new facile formula.
" Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637 (196o);
and TREATISE §§ 102-I20. For an example of judicial recognition of this "fact of life," see Judge Tate's
opinion in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Hulett, 15X So.2d 705, 711 (La. App. x963): "...in many
instances the courts actually choose those formal conflict-of-law principles which justify the application
of the law of the forum whenever there are sufficient factual contacts with the forum as to justify the
application of its own law." See also Downs v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d 640,
644 (App. Div. 1963), per Breitel, J. P., and Leflar, Comment, 63 CoLuIm. L. REv. X247 (1963).
"' Regarding the distinction, for choice-of-law purposes, between admonitory and compensatory torts,
which I have advocated for some time, see, e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Torts:
Law and Reason versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. RFv. 1 (i95i); Guest Statutes in the Conflict of
Laws, 69 YA-L L.J. 595 (196o); Alienation of Aflections in the Conflict of Laws: Towards the Lax
For for Admonitory Torts, 45 CORN.L L.Q. 514 (196o); and generally TrtATiSE § 2x2. The distinction
is recognized in RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), CoNFLICT OF Laws, comment b at 9-xo (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963).
" This rationale would support the decision for the defendant insurer in Killpack v. National Old
Line Ins. Co., 229 F.2d 851 (xoth Cir. 1956), where the court denied the claim under the law of the
location of the defendant's home office in erroneous reliance on the first Restatement, Beale, and Vrooman
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., X83 F.2d 479 (ioth Cir. 1950) (law of place of conduct applied to products
liability claim, see TREATiSE 588 n.7). Conversely, assumption of an admonitory ("penal") purpose
of a liability rule of the foreign lex actus may result in denial of liability under the lex fori. See
Consolidated Auto Warranty Corp. v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 183 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ala. 196o)(damages claimed for delay of payment).
"On the Law of the Proper Forum: Ultimate Harmony of the Rules of Conflict of Laws and
Choice of Jurisdiction, see Ehrenzweig, l1 diritto del tribunale adatto, 17 Diritto Internazionale 3 (1963),
and TREATIsE §§ 124, 174(5).
" See Mann v. Policyholders' Nat. Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 724, 51 N.W.2d 853, 857-58 (1952);
TREATisE 564 n.56. See also for a similar situation (attorney's fees against insurer), Tierney v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 59 o , 596 (D. Ore. 1963).
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Plaintiff had claimed applicability of the law of North Carolina because it was in
that state that its president had resided and died, that it was engaged in business,
and that it suffered the loss. But, feeling called on "to inquire which state has the
most significant relationship with the events constituting the alleged tort and with
the parties,"2 the court held that Pennsylvania law was applicable since "the impor-
tant events upon which liability, if any, would rest occurred in Pennsylvania."24 The
most significant relationship was thus found in that state in which "the alleged delay,
the foundation of the cause of action, took place. 25
With this reasoning we are back to the first Restatement, to that very theory
of "analytical jurisprudence," of territorialism, and vested rights, which the "most
significant relationship" formula of the tentative draft for the Restatement Second
purports but fails to displace 6 For again we are entangled in the circular reasoning
which refers us to the law under which the "cause of action" is alleged to have
vested, and again the place of wrong, so often fortuitous, assumes its predominant
importance. But it must be noted that this reversion to obsolete dogma is by no
means chargeable to the court. The authors of the draft would protest in vain that
the "most significant relationship" test, if properly applied, would discard the
theoretical basis of the first Restatement. To be sure, "in determining the relative
importance of the contacts," the Restatement Second would among other things let
the forum also consider "the relevant purposes of the tort rules involved." 27  But
not only has it, among the significant contacts, retained the places of injury and
conduct; 28 not only has it preserved the general theory of "legislative jurisdiction";2"
but it has generally maintained the concept of rules governing certain situations80
in a "neutral forum."31 Conflicts rules applicable in such a court are necessarily based
on the erroneous assumption of a law that is applicable a priori wherever the suit is
brought. If the neutral court was properly invoked, its primary reference would
always have to be to its own law and the policies underlying itY
2
The actual result in the Lowe case was no doubt prompted by its peculiar facts,
namely the lack of any indication of wrongful conduct by the defendant 3 and the
ambiguity of the law of the forum,34 in the same manner as a much-noted contract
case using the "most significant relationship" formula was no doubt prompted by
" Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469, 473
(4 th Cir. 1963).
" Id. at 474-
"Ibid.
"REsrATMENT (SECOND), CoNFLIcT oF LAws 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963); id. at 3 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, I960).
27Id. 9379 (3) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
2 id. 5 379(2) (a), (b). For criticism, see Currie, Comment, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1233, 1235 (1963).
'" Id. at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). See TREATISE 12-13, 36. For an isolated actual use of this
concept, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 151(b), comment g (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
SREsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS passim. See TREATISE H§ 103, 123.
Reese, supra note 2, at 692.
52 See notes 18 and 21 spra.
"See also Killpack v. National Old Line Ins. Co., supra note 20, where the court expressly found
lack of negligence.
" Supra note 16, at 472.
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its equities. In that case the New York court of appeals, contrary to the law of
New York, rejected a support suit by a New York mother by reference to the law
of Illinois which permitted an alleged father to buy off his obligations to the child
without judicial approvalY5  One may presume that the court did so because the
father had generously fulfilled his moral duties. 6 Clearly, then, the "most signifi-
cant relationship" formula is readily usable as a tool to give effect to equitable
considerations. But this formula, if recognized and applied as an abstract rule
for the choice of a governing law, may lead those courts unaware of the intricacies
and pitfalls of conflicts law to arbitrary decisions unguided by the indispensable
analysis of the primary law and policy of the forum3 7  Ceterum censeo....
" Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441 (596i).
" See Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, 39-52 (1963);
Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard" in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 498 (1962);
TREATISE 400.
" For critical analysis of the "most significant relationship" formula as originally advanced in the
conflicts law of contracts, see particularly Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on
Contracts, TWENTIETH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw 349-64 (Nadelmann, Von Mehren
& Hazard ed. 1961), and Rheinstein, Bo k Review, ixi Am. J. Comp,. L. 632, 655-58 (1962). See
also TREATISE § 123.
